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Abstract. It is commonly thought that evolution is a chance process, an idea found in 
popular writings on evolution, but also in academic writing in a broad range of scien-
tific disciplines: scientific, philosophical and theological. One problem is that words 
such as ‘chance’ and ‘random’ are used with a range of different meanings according to 
context, and in evolutionary biology the word ‘chance’ is sometimes used in a way that 
is different from its use in mathematics and philosophy. The present article aims to 
clarify the range of meanings and to argue the case that the evolutionary process is far 
from being a ‘theory of chance’ from biological, mathematical, or indeed philosophical 
and theological perspectives. 
Keywords: Random; mutation; natural selection; convergence; providence. 
Introduction
When Charles Darwin published The Origin of Species in 1859 it was widely 
presented as a theory that depended on ‘chance’, thereby leading to some 
natural anxieties about the theory’s implications. The reader’s concerns were 
not mollified by the observation that in the 6th edition published in 1872 
the idea of ‘chance’ still seemed to play a central role, Darwin writing that:
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As many more individuals of each species are born than can possibly survive; 
and as, consequently, there is a frequently recurrent struggle for existence, it 
follows that any being, if it vary however slightly in any manner profitable to 
itself, under the complex and sometimes varying conditions of life, will have 
a better chance of surviving, and thus be naturally selected (Darwin 1888).
The variation upon which natural selection operates in the ‘struggle for life’ 
is also a matter of chance, but then Darwin corrects himself by writing that:
I HAVE hitherto sometimes spoken as if the variations—so common and mul-
tiform with organic beings under domestication, and in a lesser degree with 
those under nature—were due to chance. This, of course, is a wholly incorrect 
expression, but it serves to acknowledge plainly our ignorance of the cause of 
each particular variation (Darwin 1888).
So the word ‘chance’ can be used in Darwin’s writings simply to express our 
ignorance concerning the actual mechanisms involved. Darwin was also 
insistent that the composition of living things in a certain habitat defined 
by its history and by its environment was very far from being due to ‘chance’: 
When we look at the plants and bushes clothing an entangled bank, we are 
tempted to attribute their proportional numbers and kinds to what we call 
chance. But how false a view is this! (Darwin 1888). The reason why it was 
false, Darwin explains, is because of natural selection:
But if variations useful to any organic being ever do occur, assuredly individuals 
thus characterised will have the best chance of being preserved in the struggle 
for life; and from the strong principle of inheritance, these will tend to produce 
offspring similarly characterised. This principle of preservation, or the survival 
of the fittest, I have called Natural Selection (Darwin 1888). 
Darwin was naturally upset when his readers did not understand his use 
of the word ‘chance’ in The Origin of Species. For example, John Herschel 
(1792–1871), mathematician, astronomer, and polymath, was one of the 
most famous natural philosophers (scientists) of his era and referred to by 
Darwin himself in the Origin as “one of our greatest philosophers”, someone 
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for whom Darwin had huge respect. This helps explain why Darwin was so 
upset when, having read the Origin, Herschel referred to his new theory as 
the “law of higgledy-piggledy” (Carey 2004). Darwin was deeply disappointed 
by this comment, writing to his friend the geologist Charles Lyell: “What 
exactly this means I do not know, but evidently it is very contemptuous. 
If true this is a great blow and discouragement.” To be fair on Herschel, as 
a brilliant mathematician, the (to him) messy biological theory simply did 
not have the mathematical elegance that he expected to see in a physical 
law. In any case, he had written years earlier to Charles Lyell (in 1836) to say 
that God does not act by a “miraculous process”, but by a “natural” series of 
“intermediate causes”. It was not the natural processes that Herschel was 
worried about, more that the theory just looked so inelegant.
Much water has flowed under the bridge since Darwin first penned 
his theory, and it is a distinctly different theory today than it was in 1859. 
Ironically, given Herschel’s mathematically based misgivings, after natural 
selection as a mechanism for evolution had gone into decline following 
Darwin’s death in 1882, it was mathematicians who came to the rescue, 
baptizing natural selection into population genetics in a fusion that we now 
call the “neo-Darwinian synthesis”. Three famous figures were associated 
with this shift in thinking: the British Marxist J.B.S. Haldane, the Anglican 
British eugenicist R.A. Fisher, and the American Sewall Wright who was 
a professor at the University of Chicago – an eclectic group indeed. Biologists 
at that time were so unused to mathematical treatments of their subject 
that Fisher’s first paper submitted to the journal of the London Royal 
Society was turned down because no one could understand it! However, 
once explained, it was clear that this new approach was very useful, and it 
has been so ever since.
Today a modern view of the role of ‘chance’ in evolution is well expressed 
by a popular writer on evolutionary biology, Richard Dawkins, who puts 
the point firmly: 
Take, for instance, the issue of “chance”, often dramatized as blind chance. The 
great majority of people that attack Darwinism leap with almost unseemly 
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eagerness to the mistaken idea that there is nothing other than random chance 
in it. Since living complexity embodies the very antithesis of chance, if you think 
that Darwinism is tantamount to chance you’ll obviously find it easy to refute 
Darwinism! One of my tasks will be to destroy this eagerly believed myth that 
Darwinism is a theory of “chance”. (Dawkins 1986, p. xi)
But here Dawkins is using the word ‘chance’ with a particular meaning 
in mind, so it is important to first review how words such as ‘chance’ and 
‘random’ are used in evolutionary biology, and then to see how often the 
uses of such words in biology are frequently different from the ways in 
which the words are understood more mathematically. 
The neo-Darwinian evolutionary synthesis has two main phases: first 
the generation of genetic variation, second natural selection. Once the 
various meanings of ‘chance’ and ‘randomness’ have been discussed, we 
will then see how their meanings relate to these two main phases. I have 
drawn heavily from my book Is There Purpose in Biology? (Alexander 2017) 
in what follows, and that publication may be consulted by those who would 
like a more extensive discussion. 
1. What do we mean by ‘chance’ and ‘random’?
1.1. The meanings of ‘chance’
The word ‘chance’ in English has many different meanings. Consider for 
example, the following sentences, with the meaning of ‘chance’ in each case 
in brackets after the sentence: “Is there any chance you can come for dinner 
tomorrow?” (enquiring about someone’s availability); “There is a chance 
that it might rain this afternoon and interrupt the match” (a possible event 
that depends on chaos theory); “I met Susan down at the shops today by 
chance” (an unexpected encounter); “I’m buying a ticket today for the 
National Lottery even though I know my chances of winning anything are 
really low” (statistically improbable); “My chances of getting top marks in 
my examinations are really low” (I haven’t worked hard enough in my final 
year at university).
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Broadly speaking we can say that there are three main meanings of 
‘chance’ relevant to our present topic, all being related to the question of 
uncertainty. The first is sometimes called epistemological chance because it 
refers to all those events that are perfectly law-like in how they happen, but 
about which we have insufficient knowledge of their antecedents to make 
predictions. For example, coin-tossing is used as a fair and reasonable way 
to decide who will start off a football match or from which end. If we had 
the right machines, cameras etc in place, it would be possible, in principle, 
for a clever observer to predict whether the coin would fall as a heads or 
a tails. In fact a group of mathematicians and others, mainly from Stan-
ford University, have done just that1. They built a machine which did the 
coin-flipping for them, using a camera that can take up to 1400 frames per 
second and, with some fine adjustments, found that if the coin was flipped 
heads up at the start, then it would land heads up 100% of the time. Clearly 
such a system would be of little use to football referees as fairness would be 
impossible. More encouraging was their estimate that in a normal human 
flip of the coin, the chances of the coin landing heads up if it was flipped 
heads up was 0.51 (for why this might be, refer to their rather technical 
paper). In other words, we might naturally assume that if we keep tossing 
a coin many hundreds of times and recording the results, eventually the 
heads:tails ratio should be 1:1, but other biased physical factors might be 
at play. For all practical purposes, however, a very small bias will not matter 
for a given match. Such is not the case for who wins the National Lottery. 
There we need many machine-generated randomly bouncing balls in order to 
generate the winning numbers and to be quite certain that there is no bias. 
The point in all this, of course, is that if we want to be quite fair in 
delegating a decision to a process that has human consequences, then we 
are best served by building a machine to do the job. But the process used 
to generate the chance result is entirely orderly, reflecting the known laws 
of physics. If we knew all the antecedents involved, an incredibly complex 
amount of complex information that we will never know, then it would be 
1 http://statweb.stanford.edu/~susan/papers/headswithJ.pdf. Accessed September 17th, 2020. 
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possible, in principle, to predict the outcome. It is the fact of not knowing 
all this information that makes the chance process useful for us (in many 
circumstances). 
Darwin’s use of the word ‘chance’ in his Origin of Species was explicitly 
epistemological in places. As already quoted, Darwin saw that his use of the 
word ‘chance’ was “a wholly incorrect expression, but it serves to acknowl-
edge plainly our ignorance of the cause of each particular variation” – so 
clearly referring to ‘epistemological chance’. 
The second main type of chance we can call ontological chance because 
there are no antecedents that could possibly be known that could enable 
a prediction, even in principle. So in this case it is not a question of lack of 
knowledge – there is no knowledge that could be known. This is sometimes 
called ‘pure chance’ because there is nothing that we can know which has 
predictive value. If I claimed that “It was pure chance that I met Susan down 
at the shops”, I might be well understood in colloquial speech, but formally 
I would be wrong because there certainly were antecedents that could be 
cited to explain our unexpected meeting: for example, Susan always goes to 
the shops on a Saturday, like me; Susan always browses in a book-shop on 
Saturdays like me, and so forth. Our meeting was therefore a chance event 
epistemologically but not ontologically. 
A classic example of ontological chance appears to be radioactive decay. 
We need to use the word ‘appears’ because we can never be 100% sure that 
there is not some hidden reason why a particular radioisotope (radioactive 
chemical) emits a particle of radiation energy at one moment rather than 
another. But to the best of our current knowledge there are no such hidden 
reasons. In practice this makes no difference in our use of radioisotopes 
for all kinds of purposes, not least in medical research. For example, I have 
spent much of my working life using the radioisotope phosphorus-32 in 
my experiments. The non-radioactive form of phosphorus found most 
commonly in our bodies is phosphorus-31 – it has just one less neutron 
than its radioactive counterpart. Phosphorus-32 is made in nuclear reactors 
and then decays by a half every 14.3 days. Even though the timing of each 
emission of each radioactive particle of energy is unknown, averaging out 
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trillions of these events very readily generates the precise value of 14.3 days 
for the half-life. The same point holds for all the other many radioisotopes 
that are known, ranging from a half-life of fractions of a second all the 
way to examples like potassium-40 which has a half-life of more than one 
billion years. 
Ontological chance stems from quantum mechanics2. Perhaps the 
most famous experiment describing the quantum properties of electrons 
or photons of light is known as the ‘two-slit experiment’ (Henson 2016). 
We arrange a wall or other barrier with two slits in it. We bombard the wall 
with electrons or with photons (of light). Either the electron or the photon 
will go through one slit or the other in a way that is impossible to predict. 
Furthermore, the “particle-waves”, to use the language of Richard Feynman, 
can go through both slits simultaneously without splitting into two separate 
particles. The two-slit experiment is unpredictable in principle and not just 
in practice – an ontologically chance event in most people’s understanding 
of the phenomenon. Is the ontological chance of quantum mechanics at 
all relevant to the mechanisms of evolutionary biology? Only indirectly, 
without playing any kind of central role.
The reason is that in the vast majority of biological processes (including, 
to the best of our current knowledge, the brain), specific single events 
at the quantum level make no difference. This is because the processes 
involve the interactions of molecules, each one of which has properties 
that represent the ‘average’ of trillions of quantum events. One single 
quantum event makes no difference to the organism. But in photosynthesis, 
the process whereby the sun’s energy is converted into chemical energy in 
plants and some bacteria, that is not the case. One single and particular 
quantum event in photosynthesis involves capturing the energy of a single 
2 There remains much discussion in the physics literature as to whether our observations 
of chance quantum phenomena reflect the intrinsic behavior of basic particles – in other 
words whether ‘chance’ at this level is an objective reality, the so-called Copenhagen inter-
pretation maintained by Walter Heisenberg – or whether there are ‘hidden variables’ that 
determine the behavior of the particles, a minority view supported by physicists such as Da-
vid Bohm. The Copenhagen interpretation is the one assumed here. If the ‘hidden variables’ 
view were correct, then quantum mechanics would be a version of epistemological chance. 
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photon of light from the sun and is really important. Of course when this 
event occurs many times, cumulatively this results in plant growth, but the 
process depends on such individual quantum events. Other quantum events 
are also involved in vision, in the actions of various enzymes, and in the 
mechanisms whereby animals navigate using the earth’s magnetic field. But 
in all cases the quantum events are playing roles in overall systems which 
are highly organized and orderly with consistent functions and outputs 
(such as photosynthesis) – they are not some hidden source of ‘pure chance’ 
coming into biological processes viewed at a functional level. 
But could one invoke ionising radiation as a source of ‘pure chance’ 
within the evolutionary process? For example, an ionizing radiation particle 
might cause the death of Lion A from cancer at one moment when that 
would not have happened had the particle been emitted at another moment 
(the lion had just entered a cave so was protected from radiation). Because 
of that event, Lion A was no longer alive to eat Antelope B which went on to 
have a large and successful family of baby antelopes. The precise trajectory 
of future evolution might be affected once this particular mutation had 
occurred. But note the proviso ‘precise trajectory’. As discussed below, for 
natural selection to occur, the source of genetic variation is irrelevant, be 
it by radiation, chemical mutagens or replication errors. Natural selection 
ensures that the overall process is one of epistemological rather than 
ontological chance. 
  The third type of chance we might call metaphysical chance, chance 
that goes well beyond science. We might even call it metaphysical Chance 
where Chance is given a big ‘C’. In 1970 the French molecular biologist 
Jacque Monod published Chance and Necessity (Monod 1997) in which 
he argued that since evolution was based on chance, so the universe was 
one in which Chance ruled. Monod concludes: “Man knows now that he is 
like a gypsy camping on the edge of the universe where he must live. The 
universe is deaf to his music, indifferent to his hopes, as to his suffering or 
his crimes”. This is the idea that Chance somehow rules over everything, 
almost as if it were an agency or a metaphysical principle. With respect to 
genetic mutations Monod wrote:
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We say that these events are accidental, due to chance. And since they constitute 
the only possible source of modifications in the genetic text, itself the sole 
repository of the organism’s hereditary structures, it necessarily follows that 
chance alone is at the source of every innovation, of all creation in the biosphere. 
Pure chance, absolutely free but blind, at the very root of the stupendous edifice 
of evolution: this central concept of modern biology is no longer one among 
other possible or even conceivable hypotheses. It is today the sole conceivable 
hypothesis, the only one compatible with observed and tested fact. And nothing 
warrants the supposition (or the hope) that conceptions about this should, or 
ever could, be revised. [Author’s italics] (Monod 1997).
The scientific conclusions on the role of chance have in fact been massively 
revised by more recent scientific advances as will our comments below make 
clear. But the interesting point here is how, based on the known science of 
his time [1970], Monod then goes on to make metaphysical inferences, as 
already noted. Monod was not the first scientist to extrapolate wildly from 
the currently understood properties of the world to conclusions that lie well 
beyond science. Here we have what sounds like Tyche, the Greek goddess of 
chance, together with Fortuna her Roman counterpart. Chance has become 
an agency, the ‘Lady Luck’ so beloved by National Lottery winners. 
Suffice it to say that Chance is not an agency and does not ‘do’ anything. 
Chance is simply our way of describing our own position as observers in 
relation to various properties of matter, no more and no less. Despite this 
obvious fact, it is remarkable how often the language of ‘Chance as agent’ 
creeps into otherwise sober scientific and philosophical texts. 
1.2. The meanings of ‘random’ in mathematics  
and in evolutionary biology
When biologists speak of ‘random’ mutations in evolution, they are refer-
ring to the fact that genetic variation occurs in an organism without the 
well -being or otherwise of the organism in view. Their occurrence is not 
influenced in any way by the needs of the individual organism in which 
they occur.
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By contrast, in mathematics randomness has a fairly clear meaning, 
although with some nuances and conditions. “Mathematicians typically use 
the word ‘random’ to describe processes in which multiple outcomes can 
occur and each is associated with a probability that gives the likelihood of 
that outcome” (Giberson 2016, p. 66). This entails, for example, that if you 
take a string of numbers, let us say 1–100, if the numbers are randomly se-
lected, then any single number in this series will have an equal probability of 
being selected. Such a series can be generated by random number generators 
of the kind that can be found on many computers. A traditional statistical 
approach then examines such a series of numbers to see whether they display 
the property of randomness (Bartholomew 2008, p. 62). No single number 
can be “random”, it is rather the process whereby the numbers have been 
generated that can be assessed as being random, and that process can only 
be assessed with a long list of numbers. For example, the number in a series 
should not depend on a number that has just gone before. If every time that 
we found a 57 it was preceded by a 23 in the series, we might worry that the 
series was not truly random, and indeed the series might then in part become 
predictable. If it were genuinely random, it could not be predictable. So no 
part of the series should provide any information about the properties of any 
other part of the series. However, we need to be careful at this point, because 
in a series of ten randomized numbers picked from 1–100 it is entirely 
feasible, if we continue to use our random number generator long enough, 
that we will come up with 23–23–23–23–23–23–23–23–23–23. This does 
not look random, but every number in the series 1–100 has an equal chance 
(1 in 100) of being chosen, so the series of 23s just shown is no more or less 
likely than any other series of ten numbers from 1–100. Furthermore, if 
we randomized that series to 11 numbers, then the eleventh number could 
be 72 – in other words, a random series of ten 23s provides no expectation 
that the eleventh number is going to be a 23: the series is non-predictive. 
Now if we apply the mathematical meaning of ‘random’ to the mutations 
that lead to the genetic variation necessary for natural selection to occur, we 
find that they are non-random. If mutations in the 3.2 billion nucleotides 
that make up our own human DNA were truly random, then they would be 
8(2)/2020 25
I S E VO L U T I O N A C H A N C E P RO C E S S?
equally likely to occur at any position, but this is not the case. For example, 
in a recent Dutch study 250 family trios (father, mother, offspring) had 
their genomes completely sequenced (Francioli et al. 2015). Given that an 
average 38 new mutations appeared in the newborn that were not there 
in the parents, if they were randomly distributed throughout the genome, 
then on average there should be some sizable gaps between them. In fact 
some simple maths (divide 38 into 3.2 billion) suggests that they should be 
separated by a median of around 84 million nucleotides. But they are not. 
For example, the researchers found that there were 78 instances in which 
there were clusters of 2–3 mutations found within 20,000 nucleotides of 
each other, which is a very much smaller number than 84 million. Several 
factors are likely to cause this clustering, although the phenomenon is not 
yet fully understood. 
For example, it has long been known that mutations are more likely to 
occur where the sequence CpG is found in the DNA sequence. This means 
that the base cytosine has a guanine next to it, and the “p” refers to a phos-
phate group that links the two together in the long chain of nucleotides 
making up the DNA. Cytosines are more likely to be methylated where this 
sequence is found. This involves the transfer of a ‘methyl’ chemical group 
on to the cytosine which is really important because if that region of the 
DNA encodes a gene, this has the effect of ‘silencing’ the gene, which means 
inhibiting or even entirely switching off its expression. This is one of the 
key mechanisms involved in epigenetics. Epigenetics denotes all the various 
ways in which the DNA itself, or its surrounding proteins, are chemically 
modified in order to switch genes on or off. In mammals 70–80 percent of 
CpG sequence units are methylated at any one time, whereas only 2 to 5 
percent of all cytosines are methylated (remember that most cytosines do 
not have an adjacent G – they need an adjacent G to get methylated). 
Methylcytosines are particularly prone to be mutated for chemical 
reasons that need not detain us here. Despite the fact that in human DNA 
only a few percent of the nucleotides are methylcytosine, about 30 percent of 
all point mutations are found at these sites. So the epigenetic modifications 
that increase cytosine methylation also increase the chance of permanent 
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DNA mutations occurring at those particular positions in the DNA sequence. 
Epigenetic modifications can “channel” mutations so that they are more 
likely to occur in one place than another. This explains the fascinating 
fact that we can cause the probability of more mutations appearing in our 
own cells by the choices we make, choices which in turn impact on the 
methylation of our genome. For example, smoking changes the methylation 
status of the DNA in cells in the lungs which may contribute to the many 
mutations in lung cells caused by this toxic habit, eventually leading to 
cancer in many cases. 
Coming back to the Dutch study, here paternal age is clearly a critical 
factor in the number of mutations appearing in the newborn. The methyl-
ation status of the genome of germ-line cells changes with the number of 
replication cycles that they have undergone during their generation (more 
in older men), and the CpG units that are methylated, and so more likely 
to mutate, are not evenly distributed throughout the genome. This could 
certainly be one reason for the non-random distribution of mutations in 
the newborn, but other factors are clearly at play as well.
Investigating the clustering of mutations in our own human offspring 
is clearly of great personal interest, but humans are not the easiest species 
in which to look at detailed mechanisms. It is much simpler to investigate 
the same question in rapidly dividing cells in the laboratory, such as yeast 
cells. In one study yeast cells were exposed to a mutagen and then had their 
genomes sequenced soon after to see where the mutations were found (Chan 
and Gordenin 2015). The striking finding was that out of an average 45 new 
mutations, there was a cluster of 26 mutations in one particular region of 
chromosome 2, whereas only 19 mutations were found in the whole of the 
rest of the genome. Therefore once again genetic mutations are very far 
from being random in a mathematical sense.
The unequal distribution of mutations in the genome has been demon-
strated in numerous studies (Rogozin and Pavlov 2003) and a recent review 
listed around eight different ways in which the molecular machinery involved 
in DNA replication can lead to a greater probability that mutation clusters 
occur rather than mutations being randomly distributed (Chan and Gordenin 
8(2)/2020 27
I S E VO L U T I O N A C H A N C E P RO C E S S?
2015). The biochemistry of such analyses can be quite complex and will 
not be discussed here, but in each case it’s worth noting that mutations 
are caused by molecular mechanisms that in many cases are now largely 
understood and where predictability based on the knowledge of antecedents 
could be possible in principle, albeit not in practice. One major source of 
mutations is the inability of DNA repair enzymes to be 100% efficient in 
repairing the DNA replication errors that frequently occur. 
The generation of genomic ‘mutational hot-spots’ is thought to have 
been critical in our own human evolution. This became apparent by a detailed 
comparison of the human and chimpanzee genome sequences. Based on 
the ‘genetic mutation clock’, our last common ancestor with the chimp 
is estimated at around 5–6 million years ago. Not surprisingly there has 
been a lot of interest in the genetic factors that contribute to us being so 
different from our chimp cousins, not least in the fact that we have brains 
that are more than three times larger. Several so-called ‘Human Accelerated 
Regions’ have been found in the human genome that are quite different 
from the chimp genome (Burbano et al. 2014). These are regions of rapid 
mutation in which more mutations have accumulated during ten million 
years of primate evolution than in all the previous one hundred million 
years of mammalian evolution. Other studies have identified an enzyme, 
originally involved in providing protection against viral attack, now involved 
in introducing mutational clusters into hominid genome sequences (Pinto 
et al. 2016). The enzyme can even cause a ‘shower’ of new mutations clus-
tered together in one region of the genome in a single generation. As this 
enzyme became more ‘switched on’ during the course of evolution so, it is 
thought, did hominin evolution speed up as new genetic information came 
into the genome. 
1.3. What types of chance are involved  
in generating genetic variation?
We have so far focused on mutations as a source of the genetic variation which 
provides the ‘raw material’ for natural selection. In practice the sources of 
genetic variation are far broader than specific mutations, and include sexual 
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reproduction, gene flow, retroviral insertions, chromosomal rearrangements, 
as well as other mechanisms. But from the perspective of natural selection, 
it is of no consequence how the variation arises. Providing the variation 
makes some difference to the progeny, then natural selection is in operation.
With this information as background, we can now assess the processes 
involved in generating genetic variation according to the three different 
understandings of ‘chance’ out-lined above. Clearly there is plenty of episte-
mological chance involved in the mechanisms of mutation. The mechanisms 
are generally far too complex to make any specific predictions as far as 
individual mutations are concerned. However, once we start averaging large 
numbers, then well-justified generalisations can be made about such items 
as mutation rates, where mutations are more likely to occur in the genome, 
which chromosomes are more likely to undergo structural changes, and 
so on. Furthermore, in many cases we are improving our understanding 
of the molecular mechanisms underlying mutational changes and these 
mechanisms follow the normal rules of physics and chemistry. In some 
cases we are able to link susceptibility of particular regions of the genome 
to mutational change with the evolution of the organisms involved. The 
‘Human Accelerated Regions’ could be an example of this. Mutation rates 
have to be ‘set’ just right in different parts of the genome to facilitate 
evolvability. If there were no mutations at all, then life would be completely 
static and there would be no evolution, so no carbon-based life on earth 
beyond, perhaps, some very early replicating life-forms. But if mutations 
were completely unrestrained then nothing would be alive because all the 
information in the genome would end up as gibberish. In fact it has been 
estimated that at least 10,000 DNA damage events occur every day in every 
cell of the human body (remembering that our bodies contain around 1013 
cells)3. So there has to be a ‘mutation thermostat’ that controls the mutation 
rate. A key buffer that corresponds to the lowering of the thermostat is 
provided by the repair enzymes that recognize errors in the DNA sequence 
in its newly replicated strands and ensure that they are repaired back to the 
3 https://news.vanderbilt.edu/2015/10/29/new-class-of-dna-repair-enzyme-discovered/. 
Accessed 19th September, 2020. 
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proper sequence. There are many different repair systems and they ensure 
the remarkable fidelity of replication of DNA. Without them we would all 
be dead from cancer rather quickly. 
What about ontological chance? The emission of radioactive particles, 
as noted, displays quantum uncertainty, so represents ‘pure chance’, not 
something that could be predicted even in principle, at least not in its precise 
timing. Ionising radiation causes mutations in DNA by directly breaking the 
chemical bonds that hold the nucleotides together. As discussed already, the 
radioactive properties of each radioisotope are known with some precision 
and their average outputs and consequent average effects on DNA can 
likewise be predicted. But it is impossible, even in principle, to predict the 
timing of individual mutational events. Could this then contribute to the 
idea that evolution is a theory of chance? Not really, because the natural 
selection considered in the next section acts as the stringent sieve that 
selects which mutations will be maintained in a population and which will 
be discarded. The sieve potentially operates on any kind of genetic variation, 
irrespective of how it was produced. 
For the sake of completeness, we should also ask the question as to 
whether metaphysical chance could in some way be derived from the vari-
ous ways in which genetic variation occurs in the genome. Jacques Monod 
thought the answer was “yes”. But even based on the limited knowledge of 
molecular biology known at that time, it is hard to see how or why one might 
wish to extrapolate from the properties of cells to ultimate questions about 
the universe and its meaning. Furthermore, even if one thought that was 
possible and logical, half a century later the molecular biology looks very 
different. We now know that many types of mutation are not really random 
anyway in the mathematical sense in terms of their clustered distribution 
through the genome, as we have just been discussing (although systematic 
studies of the type described have not yet been carried out on every type 
of mutation). The lack of randomness in the origins of genetic variation 
highlights the risk of linking one’s philosophy to scientific theories or un-
derstandings. Science moves on very fast and so the philosophy in question 
can be very quickly widowed. 
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1.4. Natural Selection
We now come to the second main phase of the evolutionary process. Darwin 
used the phrase ‘natural selection’ in order to distinguish the process from 
the human selection involved in domestic breeding of animals such as 
pigeons (Darwin spent a lot of time investigating pigeon-breeding). 
In contemporary evolutionary theory, ‘Natural selection is the differen-
tial reproduction of alternative genetic variations, determined by the fact 
that some variations are beneficial because they increase the probability 
that the organisms having them will live longer or be more fertile than 
organisms having alternative variations. Over the generations beneficial 
variations will be preserved and multiplied; injurious or less beneficial 
variations will be eliminated’ (Ayala 2007). 
In practice much variation in genomes is selectively neutral. In other 
words, this is the kind of variation that really makes no difference to the 
organism in question. If we have one amino acid rather than another at the 
816th position in the string of amino acids that make up a particular protein, 
it really makes no difference either way. So the variant amino acids at that 
particular position will drift around in a population (through breeding) 
without any effects, beneficial or otherwise, on the carrier. But as neutral 
mutations accumulate in the genome of an individual, there may come a day 
when a new functionality comes into being as these genes interact in some 
way, either via their protein products and/or as a consequence of regulatory 
sequences, and in that case natural selection may begin to operate.
When genetic variation does make a difference to the organism, for good 
or for ill, the organism will tend to leave, over many generations, greater 
or fewer numbers of offspring – ‘reproductive success’. The term ‘survival 
of the fittest’4 has sometimes been used to describe natural selection, but 
is not very accurate because survival is not really the main point in this 
process. Of course if an animal does not survive then it will not reproduce, 
4 ‘Fittest’ in evolutionary biology has a technical meaning which refers not to the strength 
or agility of a particular organism, but rather to its ability to generate most progeny 
for the next generation in comparison with other individuals within an inter-breeding 
population. 
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but the key point about natural selection is the successful reproduction that 
ensures that an individual’s genes are passed on to the next generation. 
Natural selection therefore acts as a rigorous filter to reduce the amount 
of genetic variation in a population. It is a very conservative mechanism. The 
reason for this is that the great majority of genetic changes, if not neutral, 
are likely to be deleterious for the organism, and it is these that will be 
removed from the population after some generations – or even immediately 
if lethal – since they lower reproductive success. On the other hand, the 
few beneficial changes that will readily pass through the filter of natural 
selection will quickly spread throughout an interbreeding population as 
they bestow reproductive benefits on their recipients. The term ‘selective 
sweep’ is used to describe the rapid spread of a beneficial genetic variant 
through such a population. 
Just how conservative natural selection is in its operation may be 
illustrated by the conservation of the amino acid sequence of many proteins 
that are essential to biological life as we know it. For example, cytochrome c 
plays a crucial role in the energy production of cells required to keep them 
alive in the presence of oxygen and is found in virtually all animals and 
plants. It is a small protein, generally around 105 amino acids in length. 
Change of a single amino acid at certain critical positions in the protein 
leads to loss of function and the death of the organism. This explains why 
the amino acid sequence of this protein is conserved across species. For 
example, humans share 97% sequence identity of cytochrome c with the 
rhesus monkey, 87% with the dog, 82% with the bat, 67% with the fruit-fly, 
64% with the moth and 44% with yeast with which we last shared a common 
ancestor about a billion years ago (Keya and Priya 2016). Natural selection 
is a really conservative process. 
As already mentioned, not all genetic variation will be ‘seen’ by natural 
selection because it makes no difference to the fitness of the organism. 
‘Genetic drift’ is also relevant to this point. This refers to the variation in 
the relative frequency of different genotypes in a small population, owing 
to the chance disappearance of particular genes as individuals die or do 
not reproduce. ‘Chance’ here is epistemological chance: there are very 
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good reasons why an animal might die young before getting the chance to 
reproduce. For example, it might be eaten by a lion. So ‘genetic drift’ can 
involve useful genes that natural selection would operate on had it been 
given the opportunity, but the opportunity never came. Genetic drift, like 
natural selection, is therefore a mechanism for reducing the amount of 
genetic variation in a population.
As already highlighted, it should by now be clear why it does not 
really matter whether variation comes into the genome via the pathway of 
epistemological chance (most of it) or ontological chance (as in radiation 
effects), as in both cases the winnowing effects of natural selection are 
most influential in bringing about certain constrained outcomes. Natural 
selection is like the potter moulding the clay – over a long period of time 
the consequences of genetic variation are moulded by the potter of natural 
selection to shape an inter-breeding population into a slightly different 
collection of phenotypes. 
Genetic variation plus natural selection are the central mechanisms in 
Darwinian evolution. But clearly there are many other events that impinge 
on the process. Around 65 million years ago a huge asteroid struck the earth, 
estimated to be up to nine miles in diameter, which left a massive crater 
(called the Chicxulub crater) about 112 miles in diameter and 30 miles 
deep buried beneath the sediments off the Yucatan coast in the Gulf of 
Mexico. It was this catastrophe that probably contributed to the demise 
of the dinosaurs, along with increased volcanic activity around this time. 
But as the earth recovered from the shock and climates were restored, so 
new opportunities were created for adaptive radiation, the process whereby 
rapid diversification of species occurs in order to fill up a collection of 
empty ecological niches. This is how primates began to get a real foot-hold 
on the planet, becoming more common about 50 million years ago. The 
200 primate species alive today, including us, represent the remains of an 
adaptive radiation that probably gave rise to about 6,000 species altogether.
So do such ‘chance events’ as the hitting of the earth by a large asteroid, 
so altering the history of evolution during the past 65 million years, not 
suggest that evolution taken as a whole is a ‘chance process’? It seems not. 
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Clearly there is plenty of epistemological chance here, given that there is no 
way that we could describe all the antecedents of these processes. However, 
it is worth noting that the orbits of asteroids, at least large ones, are now 
well known. Asteroid orbits are, in principle, as predictable as earth or sun 
orbits. In any event, had the asteroid not hit earth 65 million years ago, the 
dinosaurs would have eventually gone extinct anyway, perhaps for climatic 
reasons, as all species eventually do, especially species comprising large 
animals. Darwinian processes end up with replenishing the earth once again 
in the end, even though there may be some big extinctions along the way. 
None of the above should be interpreted as if genetic variation plus 
natural selection were the only two phases of the evolutionary process. 
There are plenty of other candidates that play important roles also in the 
overall process although evolutionary biologists are somewhat divided on 
their relevance. But the important point here is that none of these ideas 
or factors introduces the idea that evolution is a chance process; instead 
they tend in the other direction, highlighting constraint and convergence.
So is evolution a chance process taken overall? Dawkins is right, it does 
not look like it. Mutations are indeed random in the trivial sense that they 
happen without the organism in mind, but this is hardly relevant to the 
main question. More significant is the fact that the generation of genetic 
diversity is not random in the mathematical sense, because mutations are 
not evenly distributed across the genome. In any event the winnowing 
necessity of natural selection generally plays the most important role in 
the end. Certainly there are plenty of chance events involved of the episte-
mological variety (asteroids hitting the earth, and so forth). But the system 
as a whole is incredibly fine-tuned to bring about a carefully orchestrated 
balance between stasis and change. We are the fortunate beneficiaries of 
this history of fine-tuning.
2. Constraint during biological evolution
So far our discussion of chance in evolution has been mainly focused at the 
genetic level. In practice most biologists studying evolution are investigating 
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animals and plants at the population level. At this level also many striking 
observations illustrate the point that evolution is very far from being 
a chance or random process.
The best known example of this point is that of ‘convergence’ which 
has been thoroughly discussed in several books (Conway Morris 2003, 
Conway Morris 2015, Dawkins 2016). Evolutionary convergence refers 
to the repeated but independent development of the same biochemical 
pathway, or organ or structure in different biological lineages. In other 
words, as animals or plants face the challenges of adapting to particular 
environments, so at independent times and in independent circumstances 
the evolutionary process has converged on the same adaptive solution, in 
hundreds of cases generating very similar ways of meeting the challenge. 
Some of these adaptations are so remarkably similar that it is difficult to 
believe that a particular species with the adaptive structure did not evolve 
from the other, but such is not the case. A single example of convergence 
will be provided here to illustrate this point, although many hundreds of 
examples could be cited.
2.1. Evolution of the Eye
One of the most famous examples of convergence is the evolution of the 
eye, Darwin’s “organ of extreme perfection” (Darwin 1859). 96% of all 
animal species contain a complex optical system (Land and Fernald 1992). 
There are ten main types of eye, but most fall into two categories, camera 
eyes or compound eyes. Despite their complexity, both types have evolved 
independently multiple times in quite different evolutionary lineages, 
perhaps more than 40 times (Salvini-Plawen and Mayr 1977). Compound 
eyes, typical of arthropods like crabs and of insects like bees, generally 
consist of thousands of individual photoreceptor units arranged on a convex 
surface pointing outwards, and the image perceived is a composite of all the 
signals received from each separate unit. The net result is a pattern of light 
and dark, a bit like the halftone illustrations in a newspaper or magazine. 
Compound eyes are good at detecting movement, but overall camera eyes 
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are much more efficient. For example, if we humans had compound eyes 
instead of the camera eyes we in fact have, then our eyes would each need 
a radius of around 30 feet to obtain the same visual acuity, which would 
be inconvenient to say the least. It was the Lutheran astronomer Johannes 
Kepler back in the early 17th century who first understood how the human eye 
works, described in a publication generally considered to be the foundation 
of modern optics (Kepler 1604). As the name suggests, camera eyes work on 
the same principle as a pin-hole camera, with light entering the eye via the 
pupil and passing through the gel inside to focus on the retina, a network 
of light-sensitive photoreceptor cells that then send the messages to the 
brain where they are integrated to construct a composite image. Animals 
that have camera eyes, such as squid, jellyfish, spiders, and vertebrates like 
us, are typically predatory and very active, requiring good visual acuity to 
catch their prey. 
An example of convergence that has been recognized now for more 
than a century is that between the camera eyes of cephalopods like squid 
and octopus and the eyes of vertebrates. The similarities are striking, with 
some interesting differences also. In our eyes we have a ‘blind spot’ due 
to the exit of the nerves from the retinal photoreceptors in a bundle in 
the middle of the retina so that light cannot be detected in that particular 
area. The camera eyes of the squid and octopus are better arranged in this 
respect in that the nerves leave the retina from the back-side before being 
gathered into a bundle so there is no ‘blind-spot’. In practice our brains fill 
in the missing information, so it does not make much difference either way. 
In the present context the important point to note is that the evolution 
of cephalopod and vertebrate camera eyes has occurred in evolutionary 
lineages separated by millions of years of evolutionary time (Fernald 2006). 
The evolution of compound eyes well illustrate evolutionary conver-
gence. The annelids are a very large phylum containing around 17,000 
different living species, including the well-known earthworm, as well as 
leeches. Compound eyes are frequently found amongst this great collection 
of species and in a group called the sabellids this type of eye has evolved 
independently several times; likewise in the bivalve molluscs, of which 
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there are around 9,200 living species, including the well-known oysters that 
some enjoy for dinner (Conway Morris 2003). Not all arthropods contain 
compound eyes, but many do, and there is good evidence that they have 
reappeared more than once in separate lineages (Oakley 2003). It should 
be noted in such examples that convergence does not imply that eyes arose 
de novo each time, but rather that the genetic resources, or at least some of 
the resources, were available when the selection pressure was once more 
‘on’ to generate this particularly useful adaptation. For example, compound 
eyes are often found in arthropods deep down in the ocean where they are 
useful for collecting very small amounts of light.
Many useful accounts of convergence in eye evolution are available5. 
The important conclusion is that if you live on a planet of light and darkness 
then you are very likely to get eyes at some stage of evolution. As Dawkins 
comments: “It seems that life, at least as we know it on this planet, is almost 
indecently eager to evolve eyes” (Dawkins 2016). The adaptive advantages 
are huge and obvious. This even led Dawkins to suggest that evolution is 
‘progressive’, a notion that Darwin himself found problematic, Dawkins 
writes: “the cumulative build-up of complex adaptations like eyes, strongly 
suggests a version of progress — especially when coupled in imagination with 
some of the wonderful products of convergent evolution” (Dawkins 2016). 
3. Chance, Evolution and Theology
The concern that in some way ‘chance’ is incompatible with order and 
therefore with God’s action or will, has deep philosophical roots. Aristotelian 
science was influential well into the seventeenth century. In Aristotle, the 
physis of nature refers to the intrinsic properties of things which rarely 
5 More extensive accounts describing the convergence of eye evolution can be found in 
Dawkins, Richard. 1996. Climbing Mount Improbable, London: Viking; Conway Morris, S. 
2003. Life’s Solution: Inevitable Humans in a Lonely Universe, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press; Dawkins, Richard. 2016. The Ancestor’s Tale: A Pilgrimage to the Dawn of Life 
2nd Edn, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson; Conway Morris, S. 2015. The Runes of Evolution: 
How the Universe Became Self-Aware, West Conshohocken, PA: Templeton Press.
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change; this is contrasted with ‘chance’ or ‘the accidental’ (Aristotle 1984)6 
which thereby become a challenge to the possibility of scientific explana-
tions. But Aristotelian science was in turn challenged by the early Jewish and 
Christian natural philosophers for whom ‘natural’ meant ‘created by God’. 
The fact that the universe could be described by universal mathematical 
laws depended not upon the inherent virtues or powers of natural objects 
which direct them towards particular ends, but upon God who is the cause 
of all things. The laws of motion, says Descartes, ‘follow manifestly from 
the mere fact that God is immutable and that, acting always in the same 
way, he always produces the same effect’ (Descartes 1985)7. 
Biblical texts provide clear examples of the ways in which God is seen 
as acting providentially through what we might now wish to call epistemo-
logical chance events. When the prophet Micaiah predicted that King Ahab 
would be killed in battle at Ramoth Gilead (1 Kings 22:15–28), this indeed 
came to pass, but it happened by someone who ‘drew his bow at random 
and hit the king of Israel between the sections of his armour’ (I Kings 22:34, 
my italics). As Proverbs 16:33 so vividly puts the point: ‘The lot is cast into 
the lap, but its every decision is from the Lord’. The Bible sees God’s works 
occurring equally in all the various manifestations of his activity, whether 
in the more ‘law-like’ workings of the natural world (Psalm 33:6–11), in 
chance events (Proverbs 16:33), or in his control of the weather (Psalm 
148:8), which today we describe using chaos theory. There is never a hint 
in the Bible that certain types of event in the natural world are any more or 
any less the activity of God than other events. It is therefore no surprise to 
find the disciples casting lots in Acts [1:26] as a way of appointing someone 
to apostolic ministry in order to replace Judas. However, after the giving of 
the Holy Spirit at Pentecost, the early church then subsequently depended 
upon the advice of their leaders and the guidance of the Spirit in their 
decision-making, as in Acts 15. 
Taking evolutionary history as a whole, it is difficult to know why 
this should be seen as in any way incompatible with belief in a creator 
6 Aristotle. Physics 197a31–35, 196b, 15–16. 
7 Descartes. (1985, I, 90–1, 93–6; cf. 240–9).
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God whose providential intentions and purposes are being worked out 
through the whole process. As Dawkins points out, simply from a biological 
perspective it is hard not to see the evolutionary process as progressive. 
Sean Carroll, a well-known evolutionary biologist from the University of 
Wisconson-Madison, remarks in a review in Nature: ‘Life’s contingent 
history could be viewed as an argument against any direction or pattern 
in the course of evolution or the shape of life. But it is obvious that 
larger and more complex life forms have evolved from simple unicellular 
ancestors and that various innovations were necessary for the evolution 
of new means of living’ (Carroll 2001). Carroll chooses his words carefully, 
but if pressed every biologist has to admit that multicellular organisms 
are more complex than bacteria, that mammals are in some sense more 
advanced than yeast, and that the human brain has more capacities than 
that of a shrew. So it is perverse to deny some form of directionality to 
the arrow of biological time.
One useful way to envisage history as viewed through the lens of evo-
lution is to imagine the whole 4.6 billion year history of the earth as being 
crammed into a single day. Simple forms of life would already be appearing 
by 2.40 a.m. with single-celled organisms (prokaryotes) flourishing by 
around 5.20 a.m. The great oceans of the world start to change colour as 
cyanobacteria (blue-green algae) spread across the planet. At the same time 
the genetic code becomes established that will dominate the generation of 
biological diversity for the remainder of the day. After this early-morning 
start, there would then be quite a long wait until single-celled organisms 
containing nuclei (eukaryotes) become visible around lunch-time. A further 
seven hours pass before multicellular organisms start appearing in the sea 
by 8.15 in the evening. About half-an-hour later the planet changes colour 
as cyanobacteria and green algae invade the land. The Cambrian explosion 
starts at 9.10 p.m. and in an amazing three minutes an immense diversity of 
phyla appear, each with a distinctive body-plan, with many of the anatomical 
features introduced continuing in many of the phyla right up to midnight. 
Twenty minutes later plants start appearing on land for the first time, 
followed very soon afterwards by the earliest land animals. At 10.11 reptiles 
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start roaming the land, followed half an hour later by the mass extinctions 
which mark the end of the Palaeozoic period. By 10.50 p.m. the earliest 
mammals and dinosaurs are appearing and by 11.15 the sky begins to fill 
with birds. Just two minutes before midnight hominids start to appear and 
a mere three seconds before midnight anatomically modern humans make 
their entry onto the scene, the whole of recorded human history until now 
being compressed into less than one fifth of the second before midnight, 
the mere blink of a human eyelid. Theists will see the providential activity 
of God throughout this great ‘drama of life’. 
A strong belief in the providence of God perhaps helps to explain why 
Darwin’s new theory was accepted most readily by those in the reformed 
Christian tradition following the publication of The Origin of Species in 
1859, although clearly there were many in other theological traditions 
who did likewise. It is just that the acceptance is sufficiently striking to 
draw the attention of historians who have written on the early reception of 
Darwin’s theory, such as James Moore (Moore 1981) and David Livingstone 
(Livingstone 1987). For example, the theologian and geologist George Wright 
(1838–1921), whose books on glacial geology were for years the standard 
texts on the subject, was not only a vigorous proponent of Darwinism, but 
held, as Moore points out, ‘that Darwin’s work actually allies itself with 
the Reformed faith in discouraging romantic, sentimental, and optimistic 
interpretations of nature’ (Moore 1981). Wright even wrote ‘that Darwinism 
has not improperly been styled ‘the Calvinistic interpretation of nature’.
James Dana, professor of natural history at Yale, and editor of The 
American Journal of Science, was another American geologist of orthodox 
Christian conviction who accepted Darwinian evolution after some initial 
doubts, initiating an influential series of lectures on evolution at Yale in 
1883. Dana’s concluding remarks of his opening lecture are informative, 
because they summarise what was clearly an influential opinion in Christian 
American academic circles of the late nineteenth century 
1. That it is not atheism to believe in a development theory, if it be 
admitted at the same time that Nature exists by the will and continued 
act of God.
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2. That we cannot tell when we have ascertained the last limit of 
discovery with regard to secondary causes.
3. That God is ever near us, ever working in and through Nature… (Moore 
1981).
Just as scientists and theologians embraced Darwin’s theory in the late 
19th century, some after initial hesitations, so there seems little reason why 
this should not be the case today. Certainly there seems to be no reason to 
be theologically suspicious of the theory because it is a ‘theory of chance’. 
As we have noted here, such is not the case, and we should be thankful to 
God that he has brought about our own existence by such a creative process. 
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